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V. 
OLD DOMINION LAND COMPANY. 
YOEK COUNTY AND COMMONWEALTH OF 
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v. 
NEWPORT NEWS LIGHT AND WATER COMPANY. 
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS. 
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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, 
AT RICHMOND. 
v. 
CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS 
YORK COUNTY AND COMMONWEALTH OF 
VIRGINIA 
v. 
OLD DOMINION LAND COMPANY. 
YORK COUNT'Y AND COMMONWEALTH OF 
VIRGINIA 
v. 
NEWPORT NEWS LIGH·T AND WATER COMPANY. 
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
The City of Newport News, prior to June 30th, 1926, 
had been served with water by the Newport News Light 
and Water Company. On the date mentioned, the City 
purchased the entire waterworks system, and certain lands 
appurtenant thereto. Since which time the plant has been 
operated by the City .. 
Outside of a small pond or reservoir in lower York 
County, owned by the United States Government and used 
to furnish water to Langley Field and Fortress Monroe, 
the only_ available water supply for the City of Newport 
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News, on this side of the Chickahominy River, is contained 
in the three mill ponds belonging to this system. 
The reservoirs are formed by dams built across the 
mouths of the creeks whereby the salt tidal waters are ex-
cluded and the fresh water is accumulated above the dam 
in what was theretofore marsh. 
The country is flat and except for a few slight eleva-
tions here and there, the land rises only a few feet above 
the sea level. The reservoirs are necessarily, therefore, 
quite shallow and as a result, are exposed in the greatest 
·degree, to evaporation under the heat of the summer sun 
and the ·arying winds playing upon them. 
The Lee Hall Reservoir, in Warwick County, was built 
in 1891. It is the nearest of the three ponds to Newport 
News and is 12.85 miles distant from the present city 
limits. At that point was constructed the filter and power 
plant, water tower and the buildings for the employees. 
This reservoir furnished a ·sufficient supply of water 
until1913 when the growth of the population and a drought 
imperatively demanded an increased supply. The dam was, 
thereupon raised to the maximum height practicable and a 
further supply was sought in Harwood's Mill Pond, the 
land therefor being purchased in parcels from many pri-
vate owners. 
This pond is in York County and is· distant 2.97 miles 
from the Lee Hall Reservoir. A dam was. erected thereon, 
pumps installed, a pipe line built to connect the two reser-
voirs and through this line, 10,233 feet in length, there was 
pumped water sufficient, with the increased height of the 
first dam mentioned, to supply the constantly growing 
needs. 
With the incoming of war activities in 1917 the United 
States Government took over and developed a mill pond 
near the mouth of Skiff's Creek. This was of small storage 
capacity, not nearly equal to one-third of the possible 
capacity of Harwood's Mill Pond theretofore being de-
veloped and already used by the company 1n its system. 
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The Government built an earth and concrete dam, installed 
pumps and a pipe line 3,750 feet in length and connected 
it with the Lee Hall Reservoir.· 
The Government then took over Harwood's Mill Reser-
voir, built a new and higher dam, submerging the former 
improvements built by the company, installed a larger 
power plant and added a wood stave pipe line to supple-
mant the metal line already there, both pipe lines· be-
ing used. 
After the war, the Land Company bought from the 
Government .. the complete development on Skiff's Creek 
and under an agreement with the Water Company this plant 
remained ancillary to the system. 
At a later date, Harwood's Mill Reservoir, so de-
veloped by the Government, was, under the original agree-
ment with the Government, returned to the Land Company 
and to the water system. The Government removed its 
engines and pumps, but, of course, left the boiler and pumps 
originally belonging to the plant. The wood stave pipe 
line, put in by the Government, was worthless but the 
original metal pipe line remained. 
After the subsidence of the war activities water was 
pumped at intervals from Harwood's Mill Reservoir until 
and during the year 1921, when all three reservoirs were 
called into re.quisition and heavily drawn upon, and mil-
lions of gallons of water were pumped from both the reser-
voirs to furnish the shortage in the Lee Hall Reservoir. 
During the following years sufficient water was ob-
tained from pumpage from Skiff's Creek into the main 
reservoir until 1926. 
But in that year, during another dry period, the water 
supply in both the Lee Hall and Skiff's Creek Reservoirs 
was drawn upon so that there was not left in both reser'7 
voirs sufficient water, with the natural inflow, to supply 
the needs for over thirty days. A timely rain alone pre-
vented the immediate prepar-ation for and use of Har-
wood's Mill Reservoir. 
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These are the three resorvoirs in question. Skiff's 
Creek on the boundary line between James City and War-
wick Counties; Lee Hall Reservoir entirely in Warwick 
County and distant one mile from Skiff's Creek Reservoir 
and Harwood's Mill Reservoir entirely in York Co~ty. 
THE COMMUNITIES SERVED: 
The development of the lower peninsula began in the 
decade of 1880. For over two hundred years since its first 
settlement and with all its natural advantages, as a matter 
of history, it had remained dead, so pervaded with malaria 
that it was impossible for human beings to thrive in these 
lowlands and marshes without sanitation, nor could this be 
had without a supply of water, nor health secured without 
that supply being purified from the contamination drawn 
from these lowlands. 
In 1880, the combined population of Warwick and 
Elizabeth City Counties was only 12,938. By 1890, it had 
increased to 22,818 and by 1900 to 43,239. This was in-
creased to 47,471 in 1910, and to 72,157 in 1920. Of this 
population, 35,596 lived in 1920, in the City of Newport 
News. 
Warwick County lies to the North of the City, and in 
this County are located the communities at Morrison, Hil-
ton Village and North Newport News. Hilton Village and 
North Newport News adjoin the City park and from the 
park to the City limits is one and a quarter miles. 
Elizabeth City County adjoins the City on the East. 
In this County are located the City of Hampton and the 
Town of Phoebus. Between the City limits and limits of 
the City of Hampton, three and one-half miles distant, the 
entire territory is built up and occupied by suburban homes. 
In this territory is what was known as l{ecoughtan, an-
nexed to the City in 1927. Between the City of Hampton 
and the ·Town of Phoebus are the National Soldier's Home 
and the Hampton Normal and Agricultural Institute. So 
continuous is the development between these several com~ 
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munities that it is almost impossible to tell the dividing 
line between them. 
This whole lower peninsula is one community, based 
on the City of Newport News, with identical interests and 
needs and especially that of a water supply and must, 
sooner or later, be merged, or in some way, formed into 
one municipality. The repeated petitions for annexation 
to the City is positive evidence of the final culmination of 
this fully recognized necessity. 
In addition to furnishing its own inhabitants with 
water, the City as it is required under the general law, and 
under the Act of 1926, p. 880, furnishes water to the Com-
munities above mentioned. 
THE LAW UNDER WHICH THE CITY PURCHASED. 
The City of Newport News was incorporated in the 
year 1896. Acts of Assembly 1896, p. 47. It has under 
the Act all the rights, immunities, powers and privileges 
conferred upon cities by law and subject to all laws then 
in force, or that might thereafter be enacted. Sect. 1. 
Amongst other powers conferred, it is provided in 
Section 28 of the Act as follows: 
''To establish, enlarge or acquire waterworks, 
electric light or gas works within or without the 
limits of the said city; to contract for the use of 
water and lights for city purposes, and to agree with 
the owners of any land for the use and purchase 
thereof or to have same condemned according to law, 
for the location, extension, enlargement or improve-
ment of said works, the pipes connectedo therewith, 
or any fixtures or appurtenances thereof; and shall 
have the power to protect from injury, by ordinance 
prescribing adequate penalties, the said works, pipes, 
fixtures and lands, or anything connected therewith, 
or works, fixtures and appurtenances of water, elec-
tric light and gas companies established under its 
authority or now existing, whether within or without 
the limits of said city; provided that the council shall 
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in no way, by the exercise of the right of eminent 
domain conferred by this act, interfere with the 
rights, property or franchises of any chartered com-
pany now existing.'' 
Certainly as early as 1837, the policy of the State to 
pe~mit cities requiring a supply of water to erect its works 
beyond the City and bring water into the City has been 
recognized. See opinion P. Tucker in God din vs. Crump 
8 Leigh 120, 155. 
After the granting of the charter and the adoption of 
the present Constitution, the first Act upon this subject is 
found in Acts of Assembly 1908, p. 586. The Act is as 
follows: 
''Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Vir-
ginia, that whenever any city or town shall lease or 
purchase any gas, electric or water plant operating 
within territory contiguous to such city or town, the 
said city or town so leasing or purchasing, shall have 
all the rights, privileges and franchies, of the com-
pany or companies so leased or purchased, and the 
power to operate, maintain and extend the same, in 
all the territory which the plant or plants so leased 
or p,urchased had the rig·ht of operation in.'' 
This precise language still appears in the Code of 
1919, Section 3017. 
In the Acts of Assembly 1918, p. 465, this statute was 
re-enacted and amended by adding thereto the following 
clause: 
''And any city or town acquiring or leasing 
~ny said property hereunder shall rest under ob-
ligation to furnish, from the said property so leased 
or acquired, or from any other source, an adequate 
supply of gas, electricity or water to the consumers 
of any said company whose plant is so purQhased or 
leased.'' 
This Act for the reasons therein stated was declared 
to be an emergency Act. 
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At the same General Assembly 1918, p. 137, another 
Act was passed as follows : 
''Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Vir-
ginia, that no city in this State, which owns or con-
trdls a waterworks system, and which is authorized 
by its charter, or by general law, to sell or supply 
water to persons, firms or industries residing or lo-
cated outside of its city limits, shall be. permitted to 
sell, supply or dispose of its water to the inhabitants, 
firms, corporations, or industries of any other city, 
without the consent of such latter city; nor shall it 
operate any part of its waterworks system or occupy 
on use the streets, lanes, parks, or other public 
places in such city without first obtaining such con-
sent. And where cities are situated on the east and 
west side of the Elizabeth River, the city located on 
the east side of said river shall not sell, dispose of, 
or deliver to consumers water in any city on the 
west side of said river, or within three miles of the 
corporate limits thereof; nor shall the city located 
on the west side of said river sell, dispose of, or de-
liver to consumers water in any city on the east side 
of said river, or within three miles of the corporate 
limits thereof, except upon an agreement entered 
into between the councils of said cities, which agree-
ment shall be entered upon the minutes of the coun-
cil of each city." 
All of the inhabitans, both of the cities, towns and coun-
ties, on the lower end of the peninsula were deeply inter-
ested in the preservation of the only water supply to be had 
within 50 miles. Upon it, as said, their very existence de-
pended. There was no provision in the law for water dis-
tricts similar to provisions for drainage districts, or areas. 
The Legislature made . special provision in the act 
that the Cities and Counties should not be exploited for 
the benefit of citizens of Newport News through water rates. 
Newport News, governed in all its functions by the legis-
lature within constitutional limits, sought, in the purchase 
of the property, the protection of legislative enactment, 
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especially as to the necessity of purchasing the whole sys-
tem as it then existed. The counties were protected by the 
special provision, as follows : 
''Provided further that the Board of Super-
Visors of any county in which a part of the land is 
situated may file a petition in the Circuit Court of 
said county to require the City of Newport News 
to show cause why it should not be required to dis-
pose of any of its property held for water shed pur-
poses as being unnecessary for said purposes.'' 
The City of Newport News, without special legislation, 
could not buy the property subject to two long term bond 
issues against it and, moreover, it wanted the right of con-
demnation, within proper limits, of such further land as 
might be found necessary for the operation of the system. 
Under these circumstances, the legislation contained 
in the Act of Assembly, 1926, page 880, was sought. 
The Act further provides that the City upon the pur-
chase of said waterworks shall continue to serve the com-
munities theretofore served by said Water Company. Spe-
cially mentioned among the communities to be served, are 
the City of Hampton, the Town of Phoebus and the Village 
of Kecoughtan. The Act of 1918, ·p. 137, supra, placed 
limitation on this use in case of outside cities. The later 
emergency Act, 1918, p. 465, supra, sought to remove this 
limitation. Whether it did or not is set at rest by said Act . 
1926, p. 880, as the City of Hampton and the Towns of Phoe-
bus and Kecoughtan are specially named. Not only so but 
so far as the County of York is concerned, it is of no con-
cern to it whether water is served to the City of Hampton 
with or without its consent. 
Precise application is made by said Act of 1926 of the 
funds derived from the operation of the system so that all 
consumers in all of the territories served shall receive the 
benefit in ''reasonable rates,'' and· no money derived from 
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the undertaking could :find its way into the general funds 
of the City. It is specially provided by said Act that the 
funds so derived ''shall be applied solely to the operation, 
maintenance and necessary extension of the waterworks 
plant and system and to the payment of the bonds issued 
hereunder.'' 
It is further provided by said Act that the City shall 
succeed to and enjoy ''all rights, privileges and immunities 
allowed or granted by general law to cities purchasing or 
owning water supply plants or systems.'' 
Section 14 of the Act of 1926, p. 880, further provides 
as follows: 
''This Act shall be construed as an additional grant 
of power to the City of Newport News, supplementary to 
the general law of the State relating to the rights and 
privileges of cities purchasing or owning water supply 
plants or systems.'' 
After the pasasge of said Act, to-wit, on June 30th, 
1926, the City of Newport News purchased of the Newport 
News Light and Water Company the entire waterworks 
system theretofore operated by said Water Company, as 
well as certain auxiliary properties from the Old Dominion 
Land Compny necessary to the operation of the system 
and the protection of the water from contamination. 
The properties thus purchased, or such much thereof 
as lie in York County, were assessed for taxation by the 
Commissioner of the Revenue for said County for the year 
1927. 
The City of Newport News. in the manner and within 
the time required by law made application to the Circuit 
Court of York County for the correction of said erroneous 
assessment. 
The County, by counsel, moved to quash said applica-
tion and also filed its demurrer to same. 
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SUFFICIENCY OF APPLICATION 
Counsel for the county object to the sufficiency of the 
application made by the city for the correction of the er-
roneous assessment on the ground, first, that there is no 
allegation that the property is used wholly and exclusively 
for city purposes, and second, that under the Constitution 
no exemption is granted to municipalities on property used 
for city and county purposes. 
In reply, counsel for the City say that the allegation 
contained in the application was so . framed as to include 
the two possible constructions of Section 183, of the Con-
stitution. And we submit that under this allegation we 
may properly show that the property is used for city pur-
poses or for city and county purposes. Tfie greater in-
cludes the Tess. 
The application in the case of the Com. vs. Richmond 
116 Va., page 69, is in the following language: 
. "This application is made by the City of Rich-
mond on the ground that all of the above mentioned 
properties assessed as aforesaid· belong to the City 
of Richmond, a municipal corporation, created under 
the laws of the State of Virginia, and as such are ex-
empt from taxation under the Constitution of the 
State of Virginia, any Act of the General Assembly 
of Virginia to the contrary notwithstanding.'' 
The trial Judge, in the instant case, in passing upon 
the sufficiency of the application says: 
. "Under the law of Virginia, when a City ac-
quires a water system there is placed upon such City 
the burden of supplying those consumers who reside 
in the County or Counties, outside of such City, who 
were c·onsumers of the Public Service Corporation, 
immediately prior to the acquisition of such water 
system by such City. It was, therefore, not neces-
sary to allege in the applications that the property 
in question is used whol1y and exclusively for City 
purposes.'' 
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The second ground of demurrer :filed by the County is 
that the Act of 1926, p. 880, supra, is unconstitutional. 
1st. That it is in violation of section 53, sub-section 
17, and section 64 of the Constitution of Virginia, in that 
in effect it creates the City of Newport News into a private 
public service corporation by local, special and private leg-
islation; 
2nd. "That it attempts to confer upon the City of 
Newport News powers and privileges different from and 
greater than those prescribed by general law, and such as 
are inconsistent with the principles upon which republican 
forms of government are founded. Said Act is against 
public policy.'' 
THE ACT OF 1926. 
Title of Act. 
Counsel for the County contend there is nothing in the 
title of the Act authorizing the City to purchase the water-
works for the purpose of furnishing water to itself or its 
inhabitants, and that this omission is fatal. . 
Counsel for the City do not appreciate the alleged 
defect. 
The first clause of the Act is as follows : 
"An Act to authorize the City of Newport News 
to purchase the waterworks plant or system now op-
erated by the Newport News Light and Water Com-
pany, including the water sheds and appurtenances 
to said waterworks plant.'' 
Counsel insist that this clause in itself is all that would 
have been necessary in the title to this Act under the de-
cision of our Court . 
. In Com. vs. Ches. & Ohio Ry. Co. 118 Va., p. 261, the 
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Court quoting from Com. vs. Brown, 91 Va., p. 762, said : 
''The unanimous opinion of the Court was writ-
ten by Judge Riely and the conclusion reached was 
that the title of an act will be sufficient within the 
meaning of the Constitution if the things authorized 
to be done, though of a diverse nature, may be fairly 
regarded as in furtherance of the object expressed 
in the title. All that is required is that the subjects 
embraced in the statutes but not specified in the title 
be congruous and have connection with or be germane 
to the subject expressed in the title. And the Con-
stitution is to be liberally construed so as to uphold 
the law, if practicable.'' 
And further it is said: 
Judge Riely, in his opinion, says : ''The pro-
vision of the Constitution is a wise and wholesome 
one. The purpose is apparent. It was to prevent 
the members of the legislature and the people from 
being misled by the title of a law. It was intended 
to prevent the use of deceptive titles as a cover for 
vicious legislation, to prevent the practice of bring-
ing together into one bill for corrupt purposes sub-
jects diverse and dissimilar in their nature and hav-
ing no necessary connection with each other, and to 
prevent surprise or fraud in legislation by means of 
provisions in bills of which the titles gave no in-
timation. On the other hand, it was not intended 
to obstruct honest legislation, or to prevent the in-
corporation into a single act of the entire statutory 
law upon one. general subject. It was not designed 
to embarrass legislation by compelling the multipli-
cation of laws by the passage of separate acts on a 
single subject. Although the act or statute authorize 
many things of a diverse nature to be done, the title 
will be sufficient if the things authorized may be 
fairly regarded as in furtherance of the object ex-
pressed in the title.'' 
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And further it is said: 
In Town or Narrows v. Giles County, 128 Va. 572, at 
p. 582, it is said : 
''The Constitutional prOVISion was never in-
tended to hamper honest legislation, nor to require 
that the title should be an index or digest of the 
various provisions of the act, and it is rare that the 
generality of the title is a valid objection thereto. 
The fact that many things of a diverse nature are 
authorized or required to be done in the body of the 
act, though not expressed in its title is not objection-
able, if what is authorized by the act is germane to 
the object expressed in the title, or has a legitimate 
and natural association therewith, or is congruous 
therewith, the title is sufficient.'' (Citing many au-
thorities). 
And this is reiterated in O'Neil v. City of Richmond 
141, Va. p. 168, at page 177, where it is said: 
"This question has been so frequently treated 
by this and other courts that we think it unnecessary 
to do more than refer as conclusive of this question, 
to two comparatively recent cases in which many 
other cases are cited. They are, Commonwealth v. 
C. & 0. Ry. Co., 118 Va. 267, 87 S. E. 622, Town of 
Narrows v. Giles County, 120 Va. 580, 105 S. E. 82." 
Having thus announced the purpose of the act to be 
the authorization of the City of Newport News to purchase 
this waterworks, shed and system, which carried with it all 
the powers which were germane to such purpose, the title 
proceeds to anno11nce that other powers are either author-
ized or defined by the act and so it proceeds: 
''And to operate, control, extend and improve 
said plant for the purpose of supplying water to the 
inhabitants of York County, James City· County, 
Warwick County, Elizabeth City County, the City of 
Hampton, the Town of Phoebus, the Village of Ke-
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coughtan and certain areas and properties owned 
by the United States." 
Then follows another clause : 
''To authorize the issuance of bonds of said city for 
said purposes. '' 
And thus the title proceeds step by step to recite in 
short form what is to be found in the act following. Even 
if all the clauses following the first were stricken from the 
title, the title still would be complete under our decisions. 
''While Section 52 was inserted in the Consti-
tution for a wise purpose and may sometimes pre-
vent surprise upon the legislature and the people 
by provision in bill of which the title gives no in-
timation, it was never intended to require that the 
title contain a complete index to the act. It should 
be given a reasonable interpretation, but it is suf~ 
ficient if the object of the bill be expressed in the 
title." (Tob. etc., Asso. v. Warehouse Co., 144 Va. 
456, at p. 470). 
''Every Act of the legislature is presumed to be 
constitutional, and the courts are powerless to de-
clare an act invalid, except where it appears beyond 
doubt that it contravenes some provision of the State 
or Federal Constitution. If we doubt we must sus-
tain its constitutionality." (To b. etc., Asso. v. 
Warehouse Co., 144 Va. 456, at p. 469). 
But Counsel cannot see any surplusage in the title. It 
sets forth clause by clause the objects which were sought 
to be accomplished by the Act. · 
rc In a doubtful case, it is the province of the 
Courts to resolve all doubts in favor of the consti-
tutionality of an act of the legislature. An act of 
the General Assembly can be declared void only when 
such act clearly and plainly violates the Constitu-
tion and in such manner as to leave no doubt or hesi-
tation in. the mind. (Reaves Warehouse Corp. vs 
Com. 141 Va., 194 Syllabus). 
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DOES THE ACT VIOLATE PRINCIPLES OF 
REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT. 
In. their second ground of demurrer, Counsel for the 
County allege, the Act of 1926, to be unconstitutional a~ be-
ing, ''inconsistent with the principles upon which republi-
can forms of government are founded.'' We are at a loss 
to understand, when the provisions of the Act are consid-
ered, just what is meant by this objection, nor do Counsel 
for the County in their petition discuss or elaborate on it. 
In answer to this objection, Counsel for the City con-
tent themselves with the following quotation from Cooley's 
Constitutional Limitations: 
''If the courts are not at liberty to declare statutes 
void because of their apparent inju·stice or impolicy, 
neither can they do so because they appear to the 
minds of the judges to violate fundamental prin-
ciples of republican government, unless it shall be 
found that those principles are placed beyond legis-
lative encroachment by the constitution. The prin-
ciples of republican government are not a set of in-
flexible rules, vital and active in the constitution 
though unexpressed, but they are subject to variation 
and modificaiton from motives of policy and public 
necessity; and it is only in those particulars in which 
experience has demonstrated any departure from the 
settled practice to work injustice or confusion, that 
we shall discover an incorporation of them in the 
constitution in such form as to make them definite 
rules of action under all circumstances.'' 
DOES THE ACT MAKE THE CITY A ''PUBLIC 
SERVICE CORPORATION." 
There is no doubt but that public service corporations 
exercise a part of the powers of municipal corporations, 
while a municipal corporation exercises all of the power 
of a public service corporation together with many other 
powers granted to it, either by the Constitution or the 
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statute law of the State. Such powers are taxation, police 
regulation, matters of education and such general legisla-
tion as may be granted to it. · 
Both perform quasi-public, or perhaps quasi-private, 
duties, but only the municipal corporation performs gov-
ernmental duties. To say that the State has added to a 
municipality a quasi-private duty similar to what might 
be performed by a public service corporation, cannot by 
any possibility serve as a criterion by which to measure 
the constitutionality of an act, granting that power to a 
municipality. 
To say in this State that a municipal corporation, act-
ing under powers granted it by the State, is a public ser-
vice corporation, is to state an incongruity and an impos-
sibility. The one distinction made in our law is that one 
is controlled directly by the State while the other is con-
trolled by the State Corporation Commission. The line of 
demarcation is purely arbitrary. Both the Constitution 
(Sec. 153) and the statute, Code Section 3693, exclude· all 
municipal corporations and public institutions owned or 
controlled by the State. 
But for a distinction just as basic and not fixed by the 
precise wording of the statute, a public service corpora-
tion, while performing the public service, does so for the 
benefit of the stockholders, while the same service per-
formed by a municipal corporation is for the benefit of the 
public. The paramount idea in the one, is that the. officers 
are trustees for the public, whose powers are delegated 
to them by the sovereign and strictly limited, while the 
officers of the other are trustees for their stockholders, 
investing ·their money in the corporation, and to this trust 
is appended a public duty, from the performance of which, 
under 'the direction of the State Corporation Commission, 
the stockholders derive their profits. 
As stated supra, the City under this Act cannot make 
profit. It is specially provided that all funds derived from 








eration, maintenance and necessary extension of the sys-
tem and the payment of the bonds issued for its purchase. 
Not one cent of profit can the City receive .from such funds 
for general purposes. 
The Constitution of Virginia, Section 127, provides for 
the issuance of bonds for the purchase of a supply of water. 
These bonds are usually designated as ''(b) bonds'' to be 
paid ~ut of the operation of the plant, together with the 
expense of such operation and general maintenance, and 
then the payment of the shortage, if any, is guaranteed by 
the general-obligation of the City. If there be profit it goes 
into the general fund of the City. But this does not change 
the municipality into a public service corporation. 
This section of the Constitution is put into effect by 
Code Sectons 3080 et seq. The Act of 1926 carries out the 
·details of these sections, except that by section 4 of said 
Act any possibility of profit to the City is precluded. 
This certainly will not constitute the City a public 
service corporation within the inhibition of the Constitu-
tion providing for it. 
But it is said that the Act "enables the City of New-
port News to become a private public service corporation 
and a land speculator." And this for the reason that the 
Act gives.to the City the right to purchase the waterworks 
system and the lands appurtenant thereto and necessary 
therefor, and the further right to purchase or condemn 
· such other lands, . not exceeding fifteen thousand acres, as 
may be necessary for the operation of said waterworks 
plant or to protect the water from contamination. 
Counsel for the County, in their petition say, "could 
anything be more vicious than the grant of this great power 
to a municipality thereby creating a private real estate cor-
poration with the great power to eminent domain at its 
disposal with power to condemn up to fifteen thousand 
acres, when that is exhausted to condemn another fifteen 
thousand acres, with absolute power in itself to sell and 
dispose of any or all of it.'' 
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No statement could be further from the facts in the 
case, nor does the Act itself justify any such COJ;ttention. 
There is certainly no evidence to indicate that when the 
City purchased the waterworks it was undertaking to buy 
any property of any description not immediately and di-
rectly a part and parcel of this system. 
The right to condemn given under the Act is restricted 
solely to such .lands as may be hereafter found necessary 
for the operation of the plant and the protection of the 
water; the right to sell is only of such lands as may be found 
unnecessary. Within this double restriction or limitation 
we submit it would be impossible for the City to become a 
private real estate corporation. 
But suppose some of the lands alread'Y purchased for 
water shed purposes, or that the City should hereafter con-
demn other lands, and any of the lands so· purchased or con-
demned should be found unnecessary, the County is not 
without remedy. The Act provides that in such case the 
Board of Supervisors of any County in which the lands are 
located may file its petition in the Circuit Court requiring 
the City to show cause why it should not dispose of such 
lands as may be shown to be unnecessary for watershed pur-
poses. 
Counsel submit that, neither in law, nor in reason, can 
fhe grant of any power herein given be in violation of the 
Constitution, or constitute the City a public service cor-
poration within the prohibition of the Constitution. 
In O'Neil vs. City of Richmond 141, Va. p. 168, at p. 
172, the Court, in speaking of the powers of the General 
Assembly, said : 
''The supremacy of the General Assembly in all 
respects, save as limited by the Constitution, is cer-
tainly well settled, (Citing cases). Certainly this 
power must be exercised as to municipal corpora-
tions. They are created by law, all of their powers 






















of their liabilities are thereby imposed. (Italics 
ours). 
In Richmond vs. Pace, 127 Va. 27 4; the Court says : 
''A State government is an independent exis-
tence, representing the sovereignty of the people. 
The power of the legisltaure is the power of that 
sovereignty, and, as a general proposition, is su-
preme in all respects and unlimited in all matters 
pertaining to legitimate legislation.'' 
In the case last cited the Court cites with approval the 
opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States to the 
effect, 
''That a municipal corporation, in the exercise 
of all duties, including those most directly local or 
internal, is but a department of th~ State. The leg-
islature may give it all powers such a being is capable 
of receiving, making it a minature State in that lo-
cality, or it may strip it of every power, leaving it a 
corporation in name only; and, it may create or re-
create these ~hanges as often as it chooses, or itself 
may exercise directly within the locality any or all 
the powers usually committed to a municipality. 
In Mayo vs. Dover 53 Atl. 62 involving the effect of 
the effect of the provision of an Act requiring the town to 
furnish water to consumers formerly served by the water 
company the Court said : 
We are therefore of the opinion that the sover-
eign power of the state may authorize a municipal 
corporation, as one of the .agencies of government, 
to purchase and pay for, by money raised by taxa-
tion or otherwise, an existing waterworks system for 
the purpose of supplying water for its own muni-
cipal wants and for the domestic uses of its inhabi-
tants; and that, if such purchase is made in good 
faith, for these main primary purposes, the consti-
tutionality of the legislation authorizing such pur-
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chase .and the action thereunder, including the rais-
ing of money by taxation therefor, is not affected by 
the fact that incidentally and entirely subsidiary to 
these main and .primary purposes in the pttrchasing 
of the property the municipal corporation may be 
compelled to carry out the obligation of the original 
.water company in fu'rnishing water for some takers 
outside of the :limits of the purchasing municipality. 
(Italics our) . 
There is no suggestion in the evidence that the City is 
not conforming with the utmost strictness to both the letter 
·and the spirit of every statute appertaining to the manage-
ment and operation of its system. It is shown that the 
City, sine~ the acquisition of the waterworks has continued 
to serve all consumers to whom service was being rendered 
at the time the City acquired same. It is nowhere claimed 
that the funds derived from the operation of the system 
is being used for any other purpose than that required by 
law, or that a single dollar has been diverted to the gen-
eral purposes of the City. 
Nor is it an invasion or perversion of the trust im-
'posed upon this fund for the City to pay into the funq the 
·actual amount of money representing the value of the ser-
vice to it for fire protection, streets and such like. What-
ever question may be herein i11:volved it certainly can hav.e 
no relation to or bearing upon the question at present be-
fore the Court. 
The opinion of the trial judge in passing upon the ques-
tion whether 'the City is under the law a public service cor-
pol~ation is in the following language: 
"Supplying water to others than the inhabitants 




ing a .private water busines·s. It is the performance ~~. 
of a lawful mandatory public duty from which the 
City cannot escape. The reason for the imposition 
of this additional burden upon the City of Newport 
News is apparent. It certainly is ·not for the pur- f' 
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pose of permitting the City to engage in a private 
enterprise, nor may the City engage in such an en-
terprise. The real purpose is to insure the continu-
ance of an adequate supply of water to all of the con-
sumers of the Newport News Light and Water Com-
pany who by every right are entitled to continuous 
and uninterrupted service. Those outside of the City 
are entitled to such service regardless of who owns 
the plant and under the law they can demand the 
usual and ordinary service. Section 3017 of the Code 
is wise, reasonable and highly commendable legis-
lation. To require the City to withdTaw the ser-
vice from· those communities outside of the City 
would disrupt those communities and render exis-
tence there impossible and unbearable. The State 
permits a City to acquire its water plant for a pub-
lic use only on condition that it continue the service 
to those old consumers outside of the City who were 
consumers of the Public Service Corporation before 
the City acquired the water system.'' 
NOT FORBIDDEN BY THE LETTER OR SPIRIT 
OF CONSTITUTION. 
r' 
1 We submit that an act of the legislature can be declared 
void only when such act, beyond all doubt, clearly and 
plainly violates the Constitution. 
''The courts are not the guardians of the rights 
of the people of the State, except as those rights 
are secured by some constitutional provision which 
comes within the judical cognizance. The protection 
against unwise or oppressive legislation, within con-
stitutional_bounds, is by an appeal to the justice and 
patriotism of the representatives of the people. If 
this fail, the people in their sovereign capacity can 
correct the evil; but courts cannot assume their 
rights. The judiciary can only arrest the execution 
of a statute when it conflicts with the constitution. 
It cannot run a race of opinions upon points of right, 
reason and expediency with the law-making power. 
Any legislative act which does not encroach upon the 
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powers apportioned to the other departments of the 
government, being prima facie valid, must be en-
forced, unless restrictions upon the legislative au-
thority can be pointed out in the constitution and 
the case shown to come within them.'' Cooley's 
Const. Lim. ( 7 Ed.) Page 236. 
''Nor are the courts at liberty to declare an act 
void, because in their opinion it is opposed to a spirit 
supposed to pervade the constitution, but not ex-
pressed in words. When the fundamental law has 
not limited, either in terms or by necessary implica-
tion, the general powers conferred upon the legisla-
ture, we cannot declare a limitation under the notion 
of having discovered something in the spirit of the 
constitution which is not even mentioned in the in-
strument:'' Idem. Page 239. 
Judge Christian, speaking, for the Court in ·Com. vs. 
Moore 25 Gratt, p. 954 says: 
''The presumption always is that the legislature 
has judged correctly of its constitutional powers, and 
the contrary must be clearly demonstrated before a 
co-ordinate branch of .the government can be called 
upon to interfere between the people and their im-
mediate representatives. The decisions of all the 
courts, state and federal, speak a uniform language 
on this subject. A citation of authorities which 
establish these principles would include nearly every 
case in which a question of constitutional law has 
arisen. The rule referred to has, I believe, the 
singular advantage of not being opposed even by a 
dictum. 
''In order to ascertain whether the act in ques-
tion is a plain violation of the constitution, and a 
clear usurpation of authority in the law making 
power, the true· tests to be applied are-1st, Is the 
act in question in the nature of legislative power? 
2nd•, Does the constitution expressly, or by clear im-
plication, forbid the exercise of such power Y 
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"If the act be within the general scope of legis-
lative power, and if it be not forbidden either ex-
pressly or by clear implication, either by the state 
or federal constitutions, it is valid.'' 
In Brown vs. Epest 91 Va. 726, the Court says : . 
"The Constitution of the United States is a 
source and grant of power to the Congress of the 
United States. It is an enabling and not a restrain-
ing instrument. Congress can do nothing except 
what the Constitution, either directly or by reason-
ably construction, authorizes it to do. The Constitu-
tion of Virginia, however, is a restraining instru-
ment, and the Legislature of the State possesses all 
legislative power not prohibited by the Constitution.'' 
In Button vs. State Corp. Com. 105 Va. 634~ in refer-
ring to the propositions laid down in the case above cited 
says that they are axiomatic and lie at the very foundation 
of our institution. The Court further says : 
''As corollary to the foregoing postulates arises 
the rule of construction that in a doubtful case it is 
the province of the courts to resolve all doubts in 
favor of the Constitutionality of the Act of the Leg-
islature,'' and quotes the following from Cooley's 
Const. Lim. Page 105; Plenary power in the Legis-
lature for all purposes of Civil Government is the 
rule. A prohibition to exercise a particular power 
is an exception. In inquiring, therefore, whether a 
given statute is constitutional, it is for those who 
question its validity to show that it is forbidden.'' 
In Reaves Warehouse vs. Com. 141 Va. 194, the Court 
says: 
''It must be observed that when the State con-
stitution is under consideration it must be shown that 
there is some inhibiting constitutional limitation, for 
in the absence of such a limitation there is none upon 
the power of the General Assembly.'' 
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Again, our Court in Tobacco A.sso. vs. Warehouse C. 
144 Va. 469, says: 
''Every act of the legislature is presumed to be 
constitutional, and the courts are powerless to de-
clare an act invalid, except where it appears beyond 
doubt that it contravenes some provision of the State 
or Federal Constitution. If we doubt we must sus-
tain its constitutionality.'' 
Counsel for the County quote at length from Miller 
vs. Pulaski 109 Va. 137. 
This case was one involving the right of the town of 
Pulaski to condemn certain property declared to be neces-
sary for the operation of an electric light plant owned by 
the town. 
The purpose for which the town sought to condemn the 
property was ''for the purpose of supplying the inhabitants 
of said town, or other persons, companies or corporations 
with water, electric lights or power. The purpose stated 
and the power given was alternative and optional, either 
for a public use or for a private use. The theory adopted 
by the Court in its decision was that the coupling of the 
power of furnishing light to its own inhabitants with the 
alternative or optional power to furnish light to others 
was in effect to combine a public use with a private use. 
Such an act, the Court held, and· we think correctly, to be 
void. 
· That this was the theory upon which the court acted 
is shown by the authorities cited by the court in support of 
its decision. The first authority cited is, Lewis on Eminent 
Domain, Section 206, which reads as follows : 
''If a private use is combined with a public use 
in such a way that the two cannot be separated, the 
whole act is void. · Thus an Act which authorized 
the erection of a dam across a navigable river by a 
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city, either for the purpose of waterworks for the 
city or for the purpose of leasing the water for pri-
vate use, was held void.'' 
The other authority cited is Attorney General v. Eau 
Claire 37 Wis. page 400. In this case the statute authorized 
the erection of a dam at public cost over a navigable river, 
either for the purpose of waterworks for the city or for 
the purpose of leasing the water power for private pur-
poses. The Court held that the power was alternative and 
optional, either for a public or a private use, therefore void. 
The court in its opinion gives a very clear statement 
of what constitutes a public use. At page 142, quoting 
from Fallsburg vs. Alexander, 101 Va. 98, it is said: 
''The terms and manner of its enjoyment must 
be within the control of the State, independent of 
the rights of the private owner of the property ap-
propriated to the use. The use of the property can-
not be said to be public if it can be gainsaid, de-
nied, or withdrawn by the owner. The public inter-
est must dominate the private gain.'' 
And the right to condemn in this case was denied for 
the reason that the power given was one that the town 
might or might not exercise, as it saw fit. The use to 
which the property was to be put was one that could be . 
withdrawn or denied at the pleasure of the town, and, 
therefore, did not come within the definition of a public use. 
We submit that this case cannot be controlling in the 
instant case, for the following reasons: 
First: There is no alternative or optional power give:Il 
the City. The duty to furnish water is mandatory. 
Second: The public use cannot be gainsaid, denied or 
withdrawn by the city, but the city is compelled to furnish 
water as required by the general laws of the State. 
Third: Private gain is prohibited. 
Fourth: Not only is the public interest dominant but 
it is the only interest under the Act. 
25 
TAXATION BETWEEN CITIES AND COUNTIES. 
We have elsewhere herein discussed the relation of 
State in its control of taxation between counties and cities 
and counties and their financial relations to each other. 
This control has always rested in the Legislature and 
rarely been delegated to any other authority, and then only 
und-er the most specific direction. 
On instance is furnished in ''annexation'' proceedings. 
In that proceeding the Legislature has delegated the power 
to the courts to determine the financial conditions under 
which the government of the territory is to be changed. 
But herein the strictest rules are laid down to be followed 
by the courts. 
Indeed municipal text writers are agreed, and there 
are very few dissenting opinions in the Courts, that the 
legislature in this regard is all powerful, being limited, by 
some decisions only to results that would in effect cancel 
obligations of the territory theretofore entered into under 
Legislative authority. 
In the present case great complaint is made that the 
counties will lose revenue from the taking over of this prop-
erty by the city. One does not easily perceive the serious-
ness of this alleged injustice. When the plant is taken over 
no further expense can attach to the county on account of 
the property. If people resid-e on the watershed they would 
be subject to taxation. But none reside there on land be-
longing to the city, save only the employees, and they, too, 
are subject to taxation. There is no expense for police 
protection. That is given to the City. There are no pub-
lic roads to be maintained, for its benefit, nor schools for 
the owners or inhabitants upon it, and the city will doubt-
less provide for the sanitation of the property so that the 
county is under absolutely no expense either upon or ap-
pertaining to the property and of right ought not to be per-
mitted to tax it for the benefit of other inhabitants of the 
County. 
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But this is a question for the Legislature, not for the 
Courts. 
As said in Supervisors v. Alexandria, 95 Va. p. 472: 
"The Legislature, a's the trustee and the repre-
sentative of the general public, has full control over 
the public property, and the public rights of the 
cities and counties of the Commonwealth in which 
any change is made in the use of property in which 
two or more subdivisions of the State are interested, 
the interests of each in the property can be much 
better determined by the Legislature than by the 
Courts. 1 Dillon on Municipal Corp. Sees. 66 to 71.'' 
FIFTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR. 
It is contended in this assignment that the Court erred 
in allowing the City to ''give evidence of the waterworks 
system involved in these cases and the necessity of their 
ownership of the watersheds, over the objection of the coun-
ty on the ground that the whole question had been litigated 
and decided between the City of Newport News and the 
Newport News Light and Water Company by the State 
Corporation Commission, a court of competent jurisdic-
tion, and it had not been made to appear that there had 
been any changes in the conditions existing at the time of 
said decision.'' 
Counsel for the County are here referring to an order 
of the State Corporation Commission entereQ. on March 
31st, 1923, in a certain proceeding pending before it in 1922 
and in which the City of Newport News and the Newport 
News Light and Water Company were parties litigant. The 
County of York was not a party to that proceeding and the 
decision of the Commission was of no concern to it. The 
Water Company furnished no water to the County or its 
inhabitants. 
In that case the City made application for reduction 
in the rate then charged by the Water Company. This was 
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:the :sole .question before the Commission. In this hearing 
considerable testimony was taken in behalf of the City and 
the Water Company as to the right of the Water Company 
to include in its capital investment during the next two 
years the value of certain lands then held by the Water 
Company, both under lease, option to purchase and as 
owner. In the course" of its opinion, accompanying its or-
der, the Commission upheld the position of the City that 
certain of the said lands were not then necessary for the 
purposes of the Water Company and eliminated the value 
of these lands from such capital investment. But further 
held that the Water Company, in addition to the Lee Hall 
Reservoir, must necessarily retain the Harwood's Mill 
Reservoir, and that the Lee Hall Reservoir and Skiff's 
Creek Reservoir were not sufficient .of themselves. 
At the outset we are met with the anomalous position 
of one ·who invokes the doctrine of res judicata and yet re-
fuses to abide by it. The County would hold the City 
bound by the order of the Commission and at the same 
time reject such portions of the expressed opinion of the 
Commission as suits its pleasure. It was the opinion of 
the Commission in fixing its rate that the retention of Har-
wood's Mill was essential, nor was any evidence adduced 
·by experts testifying before it that it could be abandoned. 
Despite the view of the Commission that Harwood's Mill 
was essential to the purposes of the Water Company, the 
.county now contends that it should be excluded. As against 
the opinion of the Commission that Skiff's Creek and Lee 
Hall Reservoir~ were insufficient, the county, by an elab-
orate proposal, attempts here to show their sufficiency. In 
other words, so much of the findings of the Commission as 
is opposed to the position the County desires here to oc-
cupy is rejected. It accepts only so much thereof as suits 
its purposes. This position is repugnant to the rule of 
mutuality required in the doctrine of res judicata. It is 
not tenable. To state it is to deny it. 
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And then to add to the anomoly of the position, and 
notwithstanding the mass of evidence taken by the County 
in its effort to refute certain of the findings of the Commis-
sion, Counsel for the County in their petition, p. 31, say: 
''The mere fact that the County of York was not a party 
to the former action, does not exclude it from the benefit 
thereof, when it acquiesces therein and is willing to abide 
thereby.'' The conflicting positions are manifestly incon- . 
gruous. 
But, as hereinafter more fully developed, the Legis-
lature, and not the State Corporation Commission, is 
supreme in matters affecting the government and control of 
municipalities. This supremacy is well recognized under 
our decisions. And, since the said order of the Commis-
sion was entered, the Legislature (Acts of Assembly 1926, 
p. 880) has spoken with respect to the necessity of these 
lands. This Act of the Legislature gives to the City the 
right to purchase the entire waterworks system and the 
auxiliary lands appurtenant. thereto. This grant of legis-
lative authority is conclusive not only as to the necessity, 
but also to the wisdom and expediency, of such purchase. 
These considerations aside, however, the contention of 
the county that the order of the Commission is "Res Judi-
cata, Stare Decises, Estoppel, Bar, etc.'' cannot under the 
law be maintained. 
We take the broad position, first, that under no rule 
of law can the said order constitute a bar to the introduc-
tion of the evidence here objected to by the County, and, 
second, that the order itself, if admissible at all, will be ad-
mitted only for the purpose of showing the rate thereby 
established (which fact can have no bearing on the instant 
case) and not as evidence to prove any fact on which it 
was based. 
The doctrine of stare decises cannot apply for it has 
reference to questions of law and not to questions of fact. 
"The term means nothing more or less than the ap-
plication oi that line or rule of decision which courts have, 
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from time· immemorial applied to like pleadings, or like 
facts, or sets of facts. When a question of law has been 
determined by a decision of the court, it is considered final, 
and cannot thereafter be reviewed by a court or co-ordinate 
jurisdiction.'' R. C. L. p. 959. 
''This rule, stated in simple form and considered in 
its relation to private affairs, is really nothing more than 
· the application of the doctrine of estoppel to court de-
cisions.'' Marguerite Lumber Co. v. Meadow River Lum-
ber Company, 127 S. E. 644, 646. 
Nor does the doctrine of res judicata or estoppel apply. 
The County of York was not a party or pri-vy to the 
proceeding before the State Corporation Commission. The 
City of Newport News and the Newport News Light and 
Water Company were the only parties. In the present case 
the only parties are the City and the County. 
The general rule, stated in Chapman's vs. Chapman's 
15 Va. 399, 402, as to giving ·verdicts and judgments in evi-
dence is: 
(a) "That they are not to be admitted but between 
parties and privies.'' 
(b) "A corollary from the rule is, that nobody can 
take b,enefit by a verdict, that would not have been prej-
udiced by it, had it gone contrary." 
In that case it was held, quoting from the syllabus: 
''A record of one suit cannot be read as evidence in 
another, on the ground that the defendant and one of the 
plaintiffs in the latter suit were parties to the former, 
and that the point was in controversy in both; another 
plaintiff, and the person under whom ·both the said plain-
tiffs jointly claim, not having been parties to such former 
suit." 
A person who is not a party, nor in privity with a 
party, nor in any way concerned with a suit, cannot reply 
on the judgment as res judicata, but must establish the 
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facts on which he relies as if the former suit had not been 
brought 34 Cyc. p. 1946. 
· The County being a stranger to the former proceed-
ing, and therefore not bound thereby, cannot avail itself 
of the judgment therein rendered. There is no mutuality. 
It is a general rule that estoppel must be mutual, and 
one of the essential elements of an estopp_el by judgment 
is that both litigants must be alike concluded by the judg-
ment, or it binds neither. 
In Bigelow vs. Old Dominion Copper Co., 225 U. S. 111, 
the Court says, "it is a principle of general elementary law 
that the estoppel of a judgment must be mutual, ''citing 
Freeman on Judgments Sec. 159 and 1 Greenleaf on Evi-
dence 13th Ed. Sec. 524. 
A stranger who is not bound by a judgment cannot 
avail himself of it for his own benefit. 
In order to come within the rule of res judicata the 
·first judgment must be one binding on both parties to the 
second action, and one who is not bound by a former judg-
ment cannot avail himself of it. 15 R. C. L. 956. 
The rule has also been stated in the form that no 
party is bound in a subsequent suit by a judgment, unless 
the adverse party, now seeking the benefit of the former ad-
judication, would have been prejudiced by it if it had been 
determined the other way. 15 R. C. L. 956. 
A judgment judically determining the boundary line 
between two States is not binding upon a State which is a 
stranger to the record. Arkansas vs. Tennessee 346 U. S. 
158,. 62, (L. Ed.) 638, L. R. A. 1918 D. 258. 
It is a well settled rule of evidence that a verdict and 
judgment in an action at law cannot be received in evidence 
between others not parties to the first, nor standing in 
privity with those who were, for the purpose of proving 
any fact upon which such verdict and judgment were found-
ed and which being essential to their rendition is to be re-
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garded as established between them. Stinchcomb v. Marsh 
15Gra tt 202. 
Where the fact of such verdict and judgment having 
been rendered is ·proper and relevant evidence, as they 
can only be proved by the record, it may be admitted for 
that purpos~, but when so admitted it cannot be used as 
·evidence to prove any fact or allegation however material 
or traversable, upon which they must be supposed to have 
been rendered, idem. citing, Greenleaf E. Sec. 538, 539, 527; 
1 Stark ·Ev. 213. 
Again, in Paynes v. Coles 15 Va. 374, it is held that a 
record in one suit cannot be read as evidence in another, 
unless both parties, or those under whom they claim, were 
parties to both suits, the rule being that a document can-
not be used against a party who could not avail himself of 
it, in case it made in his favor. 
Not only so, but a judgment, if it is to act as an estop-. 
pel or as res judicata, must be conclusive of the law as well 
as the facts of the case. There must be a final determina-
tion of the rights of all parties in interest, and that by a 
court of competent jurisdiction. The sole question before 
the Commission was the matter of rate making; the case 
here presented is the exemption of municipally owned prop-
erty under the Constitution. 
In Bigelow on Estoppel (6th Ed.) p. 40, it is said : 
''The great question is, what constitutes a judgment, 
and what meaning and modification attach to the doctrine 
of estoppel as applied thereto. Now the fundamental prin-
ciple concerning judgments is that an issue once deter-
mined by a court of competent jurisdiction may be relied 
upon as an effectual bar to any further dispute upon the 
same matter, whether by.the parties to the litigation or by 
those who, termed privies, claim under them; this con-
clusiveness including of course as well the law as the facts 
involved in the case. We speak of this as fundamental be-
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cause it is the very object of :the institution of courts .to 
·put .an end to disputes.'' 
The right of the City of Newport News to hold as ex-
empt ·from taxation the waterworks system has never been 
adjudicated. Certainly it was not adjudicated in ·the pro-
ceeding before the Corporation Commission, for at that 
iime ·the City did noi own the system. 
In the next place, the judgment relied on as res judi-
cata should be in force at the time it is pleaded. 
As a ·matter of fact, the order of the Commission, 
·while based on a two year budget, with the right of either 
party to file ·a petition after one year, was never put into 
·effect. The parties, while the proceedings was still pend-
:ing before the Commission by an agreement, on account 
of the change of conditions pending the case, adjusted the 
difference between them as to the rate to be charged by 
the Water Company. This agreement was ·accepted and 
·confirmed by the Commission, the Water C.ompany retain-
.ing all of the watersheds. 
Besides, the order was in no event binding for more 
than one year and is ·not now in force, as the Water Com-
pany is no -longer in existence. 
This principle is recognized in Bigelow on Estoppel 
(6th Ed.) p.-65, and is illustrated by the following citation: 
"Periodically recurring grants of license, rest-
ing in the discretion of magistrates, creates no estop-
pel, and same objections may be made of recurring 
,hearings and be .sustained.at one time and denied at 
another, without regard to the state of the .record 
in tlie given case." Smith vs. Shann (1898) 2 Q. 
B. 347. 
Nor is the City estopped in the instant case by its-posi-
tion taken .in the proceeding before the Commission, under 
the .doctrine .of what is termed "inconsistent positions." 
That doctrine has no application here for, under the -de-
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cisions of our courts, it is limited to the same suit, or series 
of suits, between the same parties or privies and in which 
the same facts or subject matter is involved. It certainly 
cannot apply to a position taken in a case in which the 
party complaining was a stranger, and in which he had no 
interest. 
Again, we submit that the order of the Corporation 
Commission is not such a judical determination as may be 
here.set up as res judicata against the City .in the instant 
case. The power conferred upon the Commission to fix 
rates is legislative and not judical in character. And, any 
order entered by the Commission fixing rates is likewise 
legislative in character. The doctrine of res judicata or 
of estoppel has no application to an order entered in a 
proceeding purely legislative in character, or to the facts 
upon which such order is based. This doctrine applies 
only to judicial determinations. 
We do not wish to be understood as making any attack 
upon the powers of the State Corporation Commission. 
We recognize in it "a legally constituted tribunal of the 
State, clothed with legislative, judicial and executive pow-
ers.'' We concede to its orders the full effect and finality 
accorded them under the Constitution and the decisions 
of our Court. We are here only contending that the Com-
mission, in its investigation of the facts pertinent to the 
inquiry before it, and in the entry of the order itself, was 
exercising its legislative power and not its judicial power, 
and that such order cannot constitute estoppel in the case 
now before the Court. 
Western Union Tel. V o. vs. Myatt, 98, Fed. 335 ; Holm-
berg vs. Chicago St. P. M. & 0. R. Co., 214 N. W. 746; 
Stratton vs. Railroad Commission, 198 Pac. 1051; Chesa-
peake & Potomac Tel. Co. vs. Com., 147 Va. 43; Prentiss 
vs. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U. S. 210; 29 S. Ct. 67, 53 
L. Ed. 150. 
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SIXTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR. 
This assignment goes to the merits of the case. It is 
contended that the Court erred in not considering the 
opinion of the State Corporation Commission and in hold-
ing "that Harwood's Mill Reservoir and its watershed and 
all of the other watersheds were necessary to be held and 
owned as a part and parcel of the said waterworks system, 
and that the whole is exempt from taxation.'' 
The consideration to be given the opinion of the Com-
mission has been elsewhere herein dealt with. Our posi-
tion being that the opinion can have no bearing upon the 
case here before the Court, and that it was properly ex-
cluded. 
Counsel for the City believe that the question of the 
liability of the City to taxation upon the waterworks sys-
tem must rest upon the answer to be given to two questions : 
First: Is the water system now owned by the City 
used in strict conformity with the law under which it was 
purchased! 
Second: Is the property owned by the City necessary 
for the full performance of the trust imposed upon it un-
der the law? 
We have endeavored to show, supra, that the City, in 
the operation of its system, has conformed strictly to the 
letter and spirit of every statute appertaining thereto. The 
. duties required have been faithfully performed, the in-
hibitions imposed have been rigidly observed, and the trust 
delegated has been fully enforced. The properties acquired 
have been used for no other purposes than those for which 
they were purchased. Nor is. there any evidence or sug-
gestion to the contrary. This question must be answered 
in the affirmative. 
As to the necessity of the properties acquired, we 
think it may be fairly assumed that where property is ac-
quired for the purpose declared in the instant case, under 
legislative authority, the wisdom, expediency, propriety 
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and necessity ·of ·such purchase is presumed, subject to re-
buttal only in those .particulars prescribed in the legislative 
grant. It is the declared law of this State that. the .basis 
of .a grant ·of franchise by the .Legislature is to be found 
.in the benefit to the public, and, if .granted, it is upon the 
.ground that the Legislature is satisfied as to this public 
benefit. The Legislature is presumed to have had before it, 
at the time of ·enactment, ·an facts necessary to the deter-
mination ·of all questions of expediency and necessity, and 
in such cases the law requires no inquiry by the Courts, 
except in those matters designated in the .Act itself. 
In the case of Reaves Warehouse vs. Com. 141 Va. 201, 
it is said: 
''There is much in the briefs as to the wisdom, 
expediency, justice or injustice, of this particular 
statute, but these are questions to be determined by 
the ·General Assembly, .not by this Court.'' 
And tbis has likewise been held to be the law :in cas.es 
involving .the question of condemnation. 
The Court· in Miller vs. Pulaski, 109 Va. 144, s&ys: 
".That the necessity for its exercise and 'the ex-
tent to which it ·could be exercised, .and .that it was 
exercised beyond the territorial limits of the town 
were questions for the determination of the legisla-
ture and not open to . inquiry before the Courts.'' 
Again 'in ·Zircle vs. Southern Railway Co. 102 V a. p. 22, 
it is said: 
'"The necessity, propriety, or expediency of re-
sorting to the exercise of the power .of eminant· do-
main, in the absence of constitutional provision to 
the contrary, is a legislative and not a judicial ques-
tion.'" 
·On·this ·question, the lower Court, in its opinion says: 
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"When we refer to the legislative act of 1926, 
it will be observed that a distinction is made between 
the watershed property on the one hand and the 
reservoirs and other property on the other. The 
distinction is that as to the watersheds, the counties 
are given the right to fil~ a petition in court requir-
ing the city to show cause why it should be compelled 
to dispose of any of the watershed property held for 
watershed purposes as being unnecessary for said 
purposes. No such provision is made by the legis-
lature as to any of the other property, including the 
three reservoirs, etc. As to this latter class of prop-
erty under a familiar legal principle what property, 
and how much property the city should hold, the ex-
pediency and business judgment of the city holding 
and owning such property, are questions settled by 
the legislative act, as it will be presumed that all of 
the facts necessary to an intelligent decision on these 
questions were before the legislature, and with these 
facts before that body, it proceeded to pass and did 
pass the act, it necessarily confirmed the judgment 
of the city officials that all of the property except 
the watersheds, was necessary for the purpose, and 
in absence of proof of a clear abuse of power, the 
discretion, propriety and business judgment of the 
city officials, confirmed by the Legislature, is abso-
lute. The city and the Legislature having decided 
that the three reservoirs are necessary for the au-
thorized purposes, therefore, it is not now the pro-
vince of the court to decide that one or more of the 
reservoirs are not necessary.'' 
We submit, therefore, that once it is shown that the 
purpose for which the property is acquired is a public use, 
and that since its acquirement the property has been so 
used, the City, as to the expediency and necessity. of the 
purchase, has a right to rely upon the presumptioD: above 
mentioned, until it ~s .been made to appear that some por-
tion of'the property, as to the necessity of which inquiry 
is permitted by the Act, shall be shown to be unnecessary. 
Again we submit that in those cases in which the ques-
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tion of the necessity for a given purpose is properly one· 
for judicial determination there can be no doubt under 
the decisions of our Court of Appeals ·that the use, as re-
lated to the necessity, does not mean actual use. In other-
words, property may be held to be necessary even though 
not in actual use, if it has direct reference to the purpose 
for which it was acquired. 
In Com. vs. Richmond, 116 Va. 80, it was held that if 
the use of the property has direct reference to the pur-
poses for which it was by law authorized to be owned and 
held, and tends i~mediately and directly to promote those 
purposes, then its use is within the provisions exempting 
property from taxation. 
We maintain further that as to the extent of its hold-
ings the City will not be held to the proof of the absolute · 
necessities of the case. The constitutional provision as to 
the exemption of municipally owned property will be lib-
erally construed. Where doubt exists as to the necessity, 
or where the situation is one about which experts disagree, 
the court will resolve this doubt in favor of the City. The 
City will be allowed what is reasonably necessary for prac-
tical operation and public safety. And if part ·of the land 
acquired is reasonably necessary, taking into consideration 
the present and prospective needs of the City, then it par-
takes of the public use of the whole. The rule stated in 
34 N .J. L. p. 431, is that, "if held in good faith and rea-
sonably necessary to meet the growing demands for water, 
though not in actual use, it will be held to be exempt.'' 
While it is true in cases involving the correction of 
erroneous assessments that the burde11: of proof is upon 
the moving party to show that he is entitled to the relief 
asked for, the further rule of law still obtains, namely, 
that the taxing power must clearly and precisely ascertain 
and fix the subject of taxation as well as the amount of 
burden imposed, and that all doubts in respect thereto are· 
solved in favor of the citizens. The latter rule of law, we 











THE NECESSITY FOR THREE RESERVOIRS. 
If we are correct in our position that the Court can in-
quire only as to those things permitted by the Enabling 
Act, and that as to aU other matters involving expediency 
and necessity the provisions of said Act are presumed con-
clusively final, then the question of the necessity of three 
reservoirs, as opposed to a less number, could not arise in 
this case, for the reason that the Act allows inquiry only 
as to the necessity or extent of the watersheds acquired. 
If this proviso of the Act is to be so enlarged as to allow 
inquiry as to whether the City should have one, two or 
three reservoirs, then inquiry could also be made as to the 
size of the mains, the number of pumps, or as to any other 
equipment purchased. Under our view of the law, the three 
reservoirs are conclusively presumed to be necessary and 
any question with respect thereto is not subject to judicial 
review. 
Aside from this view, we confidently submit that under 
the facts presented to the Court the necessity for the three 
reservoirs is clearly shown. In passing upon this necessity 
we are not left to doubtful surmise or conjecture. The sys-
tem is not a new one. It has been in operation for more 
than thirty years. Surely no better evidence could be pro-
duced than that to be found in the experience of the operat-
ing company during that period. From this experience the 
absolute necessity of all three reservoirs has been demon-
strated. 
Added to this we have the affirmative judgment of 
every witness who has testified in this case, subject to the 
qualifying statement of George W. Fuller, hereinafter re-
ferred to. Among the witnesses who testified are, Walter 
B. Livesey, (Rec. 262), who for many years was in charge 
of the operating company, and who is familiar with the his-
tory of the company from its organization; P. W. Hiden, 
(Rec. 95-97), another witness, who has resided in this sec-
tion for more than thirty years, a large operator in timber 
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on the Virginia Peninsula, one time mayor of the City of 
Newport News, now Chairman of the Newport News Water-
works Commission, and operator of the Riden Storage 
Warehousing Corporation; Homer L. Ferguson, President 
o£ the Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company, 
(Rec. 185-186), who by reason of the fact that his company 
is a large consumer of water, has, as testified to by him, kept 
in close touch with the water supply, to make certain that 
his needs would be cared for; Philip W. Murray, (Rec. 237), 
a member of the Newport News Waterworks Commission; 
L. U. Noland, (Rec. 227), at one time a member of the City 
Council, and a large contractor, experienced in the con-
struction of water systems; Walter Taylor, who has been 
connected with waterworks systems for 33 years, and now 
Director of Public W orws for the Ci~y of Norfolk, Virginia. 
The testimony of these 'vitnesses is entitled to much weight 
because of their knowledge of local conditions, the present 
and prospective needs of the city and particularly of the 
waterworks system. The judgment of each of these wit-
nesses is·that all three reservoirs are absolutely necessary. 
The testimony of W. E. Fuller, (Rec. 113-114 et seq), 
a recognized expert, supports and fully confirms the judg-
ment of the witnesses mentioned. For nearly ten years 
this witness has had a personal knowledge of this particular 
system. On at least three occasions during this period he 
has been called upon to investigate and report upon the 
plant. He has had access to the records of the company, 
has inspected the physical lay out of the system, and is 
.familiar with local conditions and the needs of the com-
munities served. His unqualified opinion is that all three 
reservoirs are necessary. 
In this connection, the County of York offers ·George 
W. Fuller, (Rec. 289), another recognized expert, in an ·ef-
fort to show that Harwood's Mill Reservoir is not neces-
sary to meet the present or prospective needs of the City. 
The testimony of this witness is, in some respects, in the 
nature of a plea of confession and avoidance. Nowhere in 
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his·:testimony d:oesJhe:·claim that it.would .. be. a·.part o£ ~· 
d.om· for the: c-ity, to rely upon les.S! than- the three:-res:ervoirs,, 
aa; they are at ·present constituted. The plan proposed: by 
him is. an open admission that. the. Lee Hall and S1riff.'s. 
Creek, Reservoirs. are. net sufficient. in: themselves. For, 
in. .order to eliminate Harwood's: Mill Reservoir, from the .. 
system,. . he p~oceeds to state what additions. will. have: to 
be made to the· dams in. the Lee: .Hall and Skiff's Creek 
Reservoirs, (Rec. 294-295). Only with these additions and 
with the use· of what is known as Jone 's Run, does this wit-
ness. claim that a: safe and. adequate supply of water can 
be obtained. And .it is. a fair inference . .from. the- testimony 
of thls witness that Harwood's Mill can be eliminated .only: 
by setting_ ·up. ·the plan proposed. by him. The. wisdom or 
the. practicability of. this proposal. is treated elsewhere. 
herein. 
Counsel have. not deemed it necessary_ to: copy herein 
the evidence of these. witnesses in .detail. A careful read-
ing of the evidence will, however,. support the statement 
herein as to the purport of this evidence. We shall content 
ourselves by pointing out certain reasons, which in the 
opinion of. these witnesses, makes it necessary for the City 
to own and retain. the three reservoirs in question. 
Of these reasons, we mention first the . experience . of 
the plant itself. It must be remembered that it is the. duty 
of the City to maintain a: system that will meet the needs 
of consumers of water not only under favorable conditions 
of rainfall, but under·the most adverse conditions .as. well. 
The test of the sufficiency of a water supply, therefore, is 
admitted: by all to be that which will supply these needs at 
the peak period of consumption in a. very dry year. This 
peak period in the history of the Company has shown_ the· 
necessity for the three reservoirs and justifies the opinions 
of witnesses. "\Ve do not have to rely upon speculation, 
for we have the facts. As showing how urgent was .this 
necessity at such peak periods of consumption, the atten-
tion . of the . Court is. especially invited to that portion~ of 
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the testimony of Mr. Homer ·L. Ferguson in- which he re-
lates how his company had been forced to seek other sources 
of supply and his anxiety in securing water in sufficient 
quantity to meet his company's need. (Rec. p. 185-186). 
Again, taking into consideration only the present needs 
of the City, the present sources of supply are not more 
than enough to meet these needs. In addition to present 
needs, the City has a right and is imposed with the duty 
to. acquire and maintain such additional sources of supply 
as will meet the reasonable growing demands of the com-
munities to be served. The communities now being served, 
as herein above shown, are entirely urban in character. 
Their growth, while not phenomenal has been healthy and 
constant, and there is every reason to believe that it will 
be continued in the years to come. The needs of this fur-
ther development must be provided for. 
A further reason for the retention of the three reser-
voirs is to be found in the undisputed fact that every city 
should allow itself a certain margin of safety in sources 
of supply over and above the actual present needs. This 
margin of safety is given, with the exception of Mr. George 
W. Fuller, at a minimum of twa hundred per cent more 
than the present capacity. Measured by this test, even 
with the retention of all the reservoirs, the city has not a 
sufficient supply of water. 
This margin of safety is placed by Mr. George W. 
Fuller, (Rec. 305), in this case, at fifty per cent. It is 
significant, however, that in the· plants constructed under 
his supervision at Staunton, Virginia, and.at York, Pennsyl-
vania, he provided for a margin of safety of more than two 
hundred per cent. Mr. Day, (Rec. 134), City Manager of 
Staunton, testifies that in the water system constructed for 
that city, under the direction and supervision of Mr. Fuller, 
provision was made for a water supply three times the 
amount then being used and for a period of thirty years. 
In the Lynchburg Water Supply, improvements as to which 
were made 1n 1915, under the direction of Mr. Fualler, the 
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plant as installed was designed to furnish the city three 
times the supply of water necessary at the time of its in-
stallation. In the case of the City of York, Pennsylvania, 
constructed under the supervision of Mr. Fuller, where the 
city~s consumption was between four and five million gallons 
daily, provision was made for the necessary supply of water 
for the growth of the city and in addition thereto a reserve 
dam was constructed with a reservoir to hold nine hundred 
million gallons. Although this reserve was not drawn upon 
for more than twelve years after its installation the 
Pennsylvania Public Service Commission held that this re-
serve being constructed ''under competent engineering ad-
vice'; was justifiable, that the expenditure for same was 
not improvident but rather ''a prudent and proper adjunct 
to the water system and that the natural growth of the 
City will undoubtedly make it necessary to call upon such 
a reserve, even for a normal supply." (See Water Pro-
test Committee vs. York Water Company, Public Utilities 
Report, 1924, C., pages 682-689). 
With this data. in mind, Mr. George W. Fuller in this 
case testifies that in the present case no provision should 
be made for the future of this water system further than 
an increase of fifty per cent to its present capacity. The 
position taken by him in the cases above mentioned and 
the position taken by him in the present case is, to a lay-
man, simply irreconcilable. 
THE NECESSITY FOR PRESENT WATERSHEDS: 
In acquiring the system of waterworks, the City pur-
chased the entire holdings of the Newport News Light and 
Water Company and certain auxiliary properties belong-
ing to the Old Dominion Land Company. Among the sev-
eral 12arcels of land making up the whole there are certain 
small tracts located in York and Warwick Counties not 
upon the watersheds of any of the reservoirs and not neces-
sary for the operation of the plant. Included among these 
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snm:liJ t~cts~:: are.~. twa· small :.miLL ponds;·. Y:oliD~s:: Mill arul 
Cmsey.'s· Mill Tlle. one .having an acreage slightly: over 
seven aeres, the other·. ha:ving· somewhat large ac:reage ef 
la:nd but a; relatively small basin. These ponds are so in--
considerable a:S' not to be- profitable for development. These 
tracts are ·Shewn on maps introduced in evidence by the 
City· and it is admitted these tracts are not necessary' within 
the purview of the Statute. The City contends that all other 
land so purchased ·is necessary to the practical operation_ 
of the. plant, that it is .in fact so used, andt therefore, exempt 
from taxation. 
From. the topography and the general character of the. 
country. surrounding these reservoirs, as above stated, it 
appears that these- reservoirs are fed and supplied almost 
wholly from the· watersheds contiguous therto.· The two 
principal sources being·. the rainfall and t1te hund:reds of 
springs. located· on the watersheds. There are no streams 
of any moment other than. those upon these sheds. As a 
matte.Ji~ of fact, not a drop of water reaches either Har-
wood's Mill or Lee Hall Reservoirs across the concrete 
road between Yorktown and Lee Hall. To obtain water in 
any ·measurabie quantity it would. be necessary to extend 
the mains· to the Chickahominy River. about fifty miles 
distant. To dispose- of any of these watershe~s. would en.:. 
danger the very life of the system. To lessen the areas 
now embraced would be to go against both reason and good 
judgment, in the light of-the effect it would. have upon the 
sources of water supply. Any opinion to the contrary is 
pnre speculation and the City should not be put to the 
necessity of speculating upon a matter so vital. 
From the standpoint of quality of water furnished, 
there can be no· question but that ·if portions of these water;. 
sheds are disposed of and converted into· farming lands, the 
turbidity of the water must be greatly increased. It is 
uncontrad~cted that erosion must follow -this clearance and 
that. turbidity -follows ·erosion. 
#· 
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Not 9nly so, but it stands to reason that by the reten-
tion of these watersheds the City will be able to furnish 
a purer supply than if this property was under private 
control. We are not unmindful of the contention that the 
danger from pollution is to a great extent minimize.d by 
the present processes of filtration and purification. We 
believe, however, that the City is entitled to secure as pure 
source of water as is possible and to exercise such control 
over these sources as will keep it pure. It may be possible 
to purify the water which comes from the sewers so that 
it may be used without positive injury, but no City would 
choose, and no judicial authority, by its process would com-
pel the choice of such a source of supply if it were possible 
to secure a better. In a matter involving the life, health 
and happiness of its citizens, the City should not be driven 
to the danger line, or any nearer to it than is absolutely 
necessary under all the conditions. 
The retention of the watersheds is important also in 
that it will insure a more uniform 'vater supply. Fore-
station is the rule with watersheds, Mr. George W. Fuller 
to the contrary, notwithstanding. During the rainy season 
water is stored and held in the forested areas which in dry 
periods can be drawn upon. The theory of deforestation in 
this case is dependent solely upon the securing of the in-
creased storage by the raising of the dams herein dis-
cussed. Where there is no area protected for impounding 
the water it runs off and the system is deprived of it at 
times when it needs it most. 
Each of these considerations is entitled to some weight 
in passing upon the question of the necessity of these sheds, 
and when taken together we believe establish not only the 
wisdom, but the imperative need of retaining these areas. 
COUNTER PROPOSAL OF GEORGE W. FULLER. 
This proposal, with all due respect to expert opinion, 
seems so absurd on the face of it as almost to preclude 
temperate comment. It is inconceivable in the light of. the 
45 
facts pertaining to local conditions, the physical aspect of 
the properties, and the records of the operating Company, 
t1iat it should be seriously propounded. In brief, he says 
that if the dam at Skiff's Creek is raised five feet, and the 
Lee Hall dam is raised three feet, and the water in Jones' 
Run is diverted into the' Lee Hall Reservoir, the City will 
not then need Harwood's Mill Reservoir. 
Stated differently, he would h~ve the City dispose of 
Harwood's Mill, an integral part of its system, and then in 
order to secure a sufficient supply to replace that disposed 
of to incur an indeterminate expense, in building up this 
imaginary plant. 
This proposal is not in accord with good business judg-
ment. The methods demanded by the law to be adopted by 
municipalities for their protection are not those requiring 
uneconomical and unreasonable expenditures of money in 
accomplishing the business, but are the wise, reasonable, 
judicious, economical and business like met~ods which are 
supposed to and should control all governmental operations 
and undertakings.· It is not a question whether the under-
taking is possible, but whether it is wise, business like and 
for the public good. 
It is impracticable and unsound, for the reason that it 
presupposes sources of water supply sufficiently adequate 
to furnish the water required, when as a matter of fact these 
do not exist. The experience of the operating company 
shows that during the years 1911-1912-1913-1921 and 1926 
there was not sufficient water to fill the said reservoirs 
even at the height of the present dam. In the light of this 
fact it is difficult to understand how this proposal, if car-
ried out, will give to the city the additional water supply 
claimed for it. 
Again, this proposal is opposed to the best judgment 
of every engineer who has investigated these propertits, 
and at one time, even opposed to the best judgment of 
George W. Fuller himself. 
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In this connection, it is interesting and illuminating 
to note what was done by the United States Government to 
secure the necessary supply of water during the period of 
war activities in and around Newport News. Advice was 
then sought by the Government as to the best methods to 
secure the greatest supply of water. Mr. George W. Fuller 
was among the engineers brought here at that time to make 
investigation and report on the possibilities of the situation. 
Search was made for a further additional supply but none 
appreciable was found closer than Chickahominy River. 
The cost of securing this supply was found to be between 
five and six million d'Ollars. Even the United States Gov-
ernment, under the stress of war, balked at this expense 
and the work was not done. 
After careful investigation, and acting under the ad-
vice of engineers, the Government as a soluti<?n of the 
problem set up the same system now owned by the City 
of Newport News. Skiff's Creek was purchased and a dam 
constructed thereon, the same dam now to be found there. 
Harwood's Mill Pond was taken over, a dam constructed 
forming the present Reservoir and an additional pipe line 
laid connecting with the Lee Hall Reservoir. Having se-
cured these sources, the Government then constructed its 
concrete highway from Newport News to Fort Eustis on 
the James River and to the Naval Mine Depot, above York-
town, on the York River. This concrete highway was placed 
hy the Government along and on the top of the dam of the 
Lee Hall Reservoir. 
In the light of the foregoing, it is indeed passing 
strange that this counter proposal should have been ser-
iously presented to the Court. There was no difficulty in 
the Government, in those days, seizing water rights and 
land necessary for watersheds, whereby the supply of water 
could be secured, but now this Court is advised that the 
proper conduct of this system is for the city to either buy 
or condemn the land necessary to increase th'ese two dams, 
where not already owned, and to undertake the enormous 
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expense which Mr. George W. Fuller would, himself, not 
undertake to compute, so that Harwood's Mill Reservoir 
couldo be abandoned or eliminated from its water system. 
One can only look with wonder and amazement that, 
at this later date this court is advised that the Government 
and its engineers, including Mr. 'Fuller, were all wrong and 
that instead of placing a concrete road over the Lee Hall 
Dam, it should have raised the Dam three feet and instead 
of stopping its concrete and earth work on Skiff's Creek 
Dam it should have raised it five feet ando thereby the sup-
ply of water in these two reservoirs would easily have been 
increased to qne hundred and fifty per cent of their then 
capacity and that the city, despite the advice of the best 
engineers securable, should one undertake to do what the 
United States Government then apparently, never thought 
of doing.· 
Not only so, but we believe that the question of the 
taxation of the water system here presented is to be de-
cided upon the showing made as to the necessity of the 
properties acquired by the City as they were at the time 
they were so acquired. The Legislature authorized. the 
purchase of these particular properties for the particular 
purpose declared in the Act. This Act confirmed and ap-
proved the judgment of the City as to the purchase of these 
particular properties, subject only to the proviso above 
mentioned. We have a right to a decision from this Court 
as to the right of the City to relief from taxation as to 
these particular properties. We cannot perceive that the 
County in opposing the relief here asked for can success-
fully do so by a requirement to be ordered by this Court 
that t~e City dispose of certain of its sources of water 
supply because, forsooth, the City may be able to meet 
its present and reasonable future needs by setting up cer-
tain additions to its other properties. It could with equally 
good reason be argued that the City should dispose of Har-
wood's Mill Reservoir, or pay taxes thereon, because it 
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could secure an amount of water equal to that disposed of 
by digging wells, or perchance, by extending its mains to 
the Chickahominy River. 
The Judge of the lower Court, before rendering his 
decision herein, traversed the territory furnished with 
water, and, with counsel for the county and city viewed 
the three reservoirs and went through and around the 
watersheds. :· 
With respect to the necessity of the three reservoirs 
and their watersheds, the court in "its opinion (Rec. 445-
446-44 7 says : · 
''The court was much impressed with the view 
of the properties, the reservoirs or lakes impounding 
millions of gallons of water, the watersheds, and the 
water system carrying water to the consumers. It 
is also impressive to view the physical layout of the 
lower peninsula, the natural surroundings and ad-
vantages ,the growth of the cities and towns, and 
the enterprise of the people. This peninsula is of 
supreme importance in war times. A successful 
future may safely be predicted for it." 
''As long as the watersheds now owned by the 
city, or in the future acquired, are necessary to sup-
ply water to those lawfully entitled to water, the 
Legislature contemplated that such watersheds would 
not be taxable.'' 
''But if we are not correct in the view here ex-
pressed, the evidence ·clearly shows that not only 
are the three reservoirs necessary, bu~ the water-
sheds now owned by the city are necessary for a 
p~blic use. When we analyze the evidence of the 
two expert witnesses, ~Ir. Weston Fuller and Mr. 
George W. Fuller, who have made a scientific in-
vestigation of water conditions on the lower penin-
sula, it is seen that they are directly opposed to each 
other in their views. No one can reconcile their evi-
dence. In the light of this fact, aside from scientific 
views, it will be necessary to adopt that view which 
more nearly approaches reason and common sense. 
The testimony of Mr. Weston Fuller appears to be 
49 
reasonable, and the court prefers to adopt his view 
rather than the view of Mr. George Fuller. But if 
we give no weight to the testimony of either of these 
witnesses,. there are other witnesses. Mr. Riden, Mr. 
Ferguson and others, who appear to be intelligent 
men of wide and extensive experience, and who 
through necessity have, from a layman's standpoint, 
made investigation of the water situation from time 
to time. From the testimony of these witnesses alone 
the court is justified in concluding that all of the 
· properties now. owned by the city are necessary for 
public use.'' 
RIGHT OF CITY TO EXEMPTION. 
The right to exemption he:re claimed must ultimately 
rest upon the construction of S~ction 183 of the Constitu-
tion. This Section, so far as applicable here, is as follows: 
''Except as otherwise provided in this Consti-
tution the following property and no other, shall be 
exempt from taxation, State and local; but the Gen-
eral Assembly may hereafter tax any of the prop-
erty hereby exempted save that mentioned in sub-
section (a).". 
The property exempted under sub-section (a) is as 
follows: 
. ''Property directly or indirectly owned by that 
State, however held, and property lawfully owned 
and held by counties, cities, towns, or school dis-
tricts, used wholly and exclusively for county, city, 
towp or public school purposes.'' 
Before discussing this Section, it may be said that 
practically all the authorities agree that there is a presump-
tion in favor of the exemption of property held by the State 
and its municipalities and that only the clearest language 
will subject such property to taxation. 
This is perhaps nowhere better stated than in the fol-
lowing language of Judge Cooley: 
50 
''Before noticing the exemptions expressly made 
by law, it will be convenient to speak of some which 
rest upon implication. Some things are always pre-
sumptively exempted from the operation of general 
tax laws, because it is reasonable to suppose they 
were not within the intent of the legislature in adopt-
ing them. Such is the case with property belonging 
to the State and it; IDJlllicipalities, and which is held 
by them for governmental purposes. All such prop-
erty is taxable, if the State shall see fit to tax it; but 
to levy a tax upon it would render necessary new 
taxes to meet the demand of this tax, and thus the 
public would be taxing itself, and no one would be 
benefited but the officers employed, whose compen-
sation would go to increase the useless tax. It can-
not be supposed that the legislature would ever pur-
posely lay such a burden upon public property, and 
it is, therefore, a reasonable conclusion that, how-
ever general may be the enumeration of property for 
taxation, the property held by the State and by all 
its municipalities for governmental purposes was 
intended to be excluded, and the law will be admin-
istered as excluding it in fact.'' Cooley on Taxation 
3rd Ed. p. 263. 
The continuous policy of the State, as to municipally 
owned property, for more than a hundred years has been 
that of exemption. From the earliest enactment in 13 Hen-
ning's Stat. at Large, p. 112, passed in 1790, to the adoption 
of the present Constitution, this policy has continued. Vary-
ing phraseology is used from time to time in the re-enact-
ment of the statutes relating thereto, but the policy to ex-
empt is manifest throughout. There is not a single ;legis-
lative utterance to the contrary. 
Not only so, but Section 183 has now been in force for 
nearly twenty-five years and in its construction the prin-
ciple of exemption has been continuously recognized both 
by the court and by the administrative officers of the State. 
The Legislature with full knowledge of this construction 
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has failed to legislate. This we contend is a further legis-
lative adoption ·of this interpretation. 
The test or rule which determines whether municipally 
owned property comes within the exemption of Section 183 
of the Constitution has been clearly defined in the decisions 
of our Court of Appeals. 
This test is to be found in the statement of the Court 
in the case of Commonwealth vs. Richmond, -116, Va. 69. 
The Court here says : 
''The test whether a use is public or not is 
whether a public trust is imposed upon the property, 
whether the public has a legal right to the use which 
can not be gainsaid or denied, or withdrawn by the 
owner.'' 
We take the position that once we establish for the 
undertaking a public purpose, when we show that the domi-
nant use to which the property is put is a public use, the 
exemption applies, without regard to the location of the 
property, or whether it is revenue producing or not, or as in 
the case of waterworks whether others outside of the city are 
served with water. Before it can be held to the contrary it 
must 'be shown that the dominant use is a private use. 
This position we believe is sustained by text-writers, 
by the great weight of authority in other States, as well as 
by the decisions of our own State. 
A very clear statement of the law is to be found in 
Section 1299 of Dillon on ~Iunicipal Corporations, as fol-
lows: 
''The purpose for which a municipality is au-
thorized to construct waterworks or to contract for 
a supply of water is usually to supply its own needs 
and the needs of its inhabitants, and it may be laid 
down as a general rule that a grant of power to a 
municipality for these purposes gives it by implica-
tion no authority to enter into the business of fur-
nishing water to persons beyond the municipal limits. 
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Nor does authority to provide water or light for its 
own use and for the use of its inhabitants authorize 
a municipality to go into the business of buying and 
selling water as a commodity to other municipalities. 
But in the absence of any constitutional restriction 
or prohibition, it is within the power of the legisla-
ture to authorize a municipality, at least as an in-
cident to the construction and maintenance of its 
own waterworks, to contract with neighboring muni-
cipalities to supply water thereto or to their inhabi-
tants. And in California it has been held that when 
a city is authorized to acquire waters and water 
rights beyond its limits, and in the exercise of that 
authority acquired the property of a water company, 
which under the Constitution and statutes of that 
State is charged with the duty of supplying persons 
with water outside the city limits, the city becomes 
bound, upon the purchase of the water rights and 
property of the company, to fulfill its constitutional 
and statutory obligation, and to supply the persons 
entitled to receive a supply from the source acquired 
by it from the water company." 
In Com. vs. Y. M. C. A., 115 Va. 7 46, it is said : 
"If the dominant purpose in the use made of 
these rooms is to obtain revenue or profit, although 
it is to be applied to the general objects of the asso-
ciation, it would render the property liable to taxa-
tion. But if the use made of those rooms has direct 
reference to the purpose for which the association 
was incorporated, and tends immediately and di-
rectly to promote those purposes, then its use is 
within the provisions exempting the property from 
taxation, although reve:Q.ue or profit is derived there-
from as incident to such use.'' 
In Com. vs. Hampton Inst., 106 Va. 614, the Court says: 
''It is the use to which the property of an edu-
cational institution is put which determines whether 
or not it is exempt from taxation under the constitu-
tion, and not the use to which profits realized from 
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the property it put. Property not used for educa-
tional purposes, but leased to third persons, is liable 
to taxation, although the rents be applied to such 
educational purposes; but such letting of a part of 
its property does not render the residue not let liable 
to taxation.'' 
''Although an educational institution may derive 
a profit from the sale of the surplus products of a 
'model farm' which it is authorized by its charter 
to conduct, the farm so conducted is not liable to 
taxation under section 183 of the constitution provid-
ing that lands of such institution shall be liable to 
taxation if they are a 'source of income or profit,' 
where it would be difficult, if not impossible, to de-
termine with exactness the ratio between that which 
would be taxable as constituting a source of revenue, 
and that which would be exempt as being wholly de-
voted to educational purposes. The state must 
clearly and precisely ascertain and fix the subject 
of taxation and the amount of the burden imposed, 
and·· all doubts in respect thereto are to be solved in 
favor of the citizen." 
The attention of the Court is particularly invited to the 
case of Com. vs. Richmond, 116, Va., 69, as we believe that 
case to be determinative of the questions presented in the 
instant case. 
In this case the Commissioner of the Revenue for the 
City of Richmond had assessed taxes in favor of the Com-
monwealth for the year 1912, upon certain properties and 
utilities owned by the City, including an auditorium, water-
works, gas works, sewerage system and certain lands and 
. buildings owned and used by the City in the operation of 
said properties and utilities. The City proceeded under 
the Statute for the correction of the alleged erroneous as-
sessment. 
The contention of the Commonwealth was based upon 
the ground that from each ''the auditorium building, the 
market houses, the waterworks, and the gas works, the city 
habitually receives and collects a net r.evenue largely in 
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excess of the cost of maintaining these utilities, all of which 
is covered into the treasury of the city and used for its 
general purposes, which . . . renders each and every 
one of these properties liable to taxation under the express 
provision of the Constitution.'' The Court in this case 
held these properties to be not taxable. 
Just how far reaching is the decision in this case will 
perhaps be better understood by a brief review of the con-
tentions made by counsel for the Commonwealth in their 
brief filed in the Court of Appeals and the decision of the 
Court thereon. 
As against the contention of the Commonwealth that 
the legislative policy and the construction of the ~ourt 
prior to the adoption of the present Constitution could 
have no bearing upon the construction of Section 183, the 
Court says: 
''The exemptions from taxation provided by 
Section 183 of the Constitution are in accord with 
the policy of the State from an early date. The 
Constitutional Convention, in taking away the power 
of exemption from the legislature, did not intend to 
change the policy of the State on the subject, but 
placed limitations upon the use of the property ex-
empted so as to prevent the perversion or abuse of 
the liberality of the State.'' 
.AJ:, against the contention of the Commonwealth that 
taxtion is the rule, and exemption the exception, that every 
presumption is in favor of the taxing, and that unless the 
Court is satisfied beyond doubt that it was the intention of 
the law makers to exempt the property, it is clearly liable, 
the Court says, quoting from Com. vs. Lynchburg, 115 Va. 
745: 
''The general rule is that provi~ions exempting 
property of individuals or private corporations from 
taxation must be strictly construed, taxation of such 
property being the ru1e and exemption from taxa-
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tion the exeception. One of the reasons for this is, 
that all such persons . should bear their fair share 
of the burdens of taxation, and that lessening the 
burden of one increases the burdens of others. But 
as the policy of the State has always been to exempt 
property of the character mentioned and described 
in Section 183 of the Constitution, it should not be 
construed with the same degree of strictness that 
applies. to provisions making exemptions contrary to 
the policy of the State, since as to such property 
exemption is the rule and taxation is the exception." 
In commenting on the rule above stated, the Court says : 
''The rule of construction of the provisions of 
Section 183 of the Constitution, applied in the case 
just quoted from, upon sound reasoning as well as 
upon authority, applies with greater force where the 
property sought to be taxed is lawfully owned and 
used by a municipality which is but a part of the 
State, exercising for specific purposes a portion of the 
sovereign power delegated to it, the municipality be-
ing but a political sub-division of the State, and such 
property stands related to the Commonwealth as its 
own.'' 
As against the contention of the Commonwealth that 
the use of the property, either wholly or partially, so as to 
make it a source of revenue or profit, renders the property 
liable to taxation under the Constitution, the Court holds : 
''The pririciple sustained by the 'weight of au-
thority,' as well as elementary writers, is that all 
property lawfully owned and held by cities and towns 
for governmental purposes, though a source of reve-
nue or profit, which was paid into the city treasury 
and used for municipal purposes by the city, the 
dominant purpose in the use having direct reference 
to the purposes for which the property is authorized 
by law to be owned and held, and tends immediately 
and directly to promote those purposes, is exemp-
tion from taxation.'' 
56 
.AB against the· contention of' the Connnonwealth that 
the use of property is not a governmental purpose, but 
strictly a business purpose, it is said by the Court ~ 
~'The exemptions from taxation provided for by 
Section 183 t>f the Constitution of property lawfully 
owned and held by a. city wholly and exclusively used 
for city, county, town, charitable, educational, or 
religious purposes, are not defeated or annulled by 
the mere fact that revenue or profit, over and above 
the cost of maintenance, is realized from the prop-
erty. If the use of the property so held has direct 
reference to the purposes for which it is by law au-
thorized by law to be owned and held,. and tends im-
mediately and directly to promote those purposes, 
then its use is within . the provisions exempting the 
property from taxation, although revenue or profit is 
derived therefrom as incident to such use.'' 
As against the contention of the Commonwealth that 
to permit municipalities to go into the maintenance of such 
utilities, in competition with individuals, for the purpose of 
creating revenue, is contrary to the intention of the framers 
of the Constitution, the Court cites the case of Huron 
Waterworks vs. City of Huron, 62 N. W. 975, as authority 
for the statement that waterworks are held in trust for 
public purposes, and that ''no distinction could be made be-
tween the nature of waterworks property owned and held 
by a city, and public parks, squares, city halls, cemeteries, 
court houses and other property owned and held by a city 
for public use.'' 
The Court not only forever set at rest the contention 
that revenue is the test of whether a use is public or not, 
but proceeds to state in clear terms just what is the test 
in the following language : 
''The test whether a use is public or not is 
whether a public trust is imposed upon the property, 
whether the public has a legal right to the use which 
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cannot be gainsaid or denied, or withdrawn by the 
owner.'' 
While the last cited case was pending in the Court of 
Appeals, the Commonwealth filed its petition for appeal in 
the Court of Appeals, in a case decided by the Circuit Court 
for the City of Richmond involving the question of the 
waterworks plant owned and operated by the City of Lynch-
burg. 
It appears from the record in that case, that in 1903, 
the City of Lynchburg undertook to secure a supply of 
water from Pedlar Creek in the County of Amherst, and 
for this purpose purchased the site for the dam and also 
about four thousand acres of land in Amherst County as 
a watershed. This acreage was subsequently increased to 
six thousand five hundred acres. 
In the year 1907, a portion of the land in the County 
of Amherst was assessed for taxation, but on application 
for correction of erroneous assessment the same was re-
leased. Again in the year 1908, a portion of the land was 
assessed and similarly released. Afterwards, the County 
of Amherst again assessed taxes against 4,262 acres of land 
owned by the city for the year 1911. 
Upon refusal of the city to pay the taxes the officers 
of the county proceeded to advertise for sale a sufficient 
amount of timber standing on the land to pay the taxes 
so assessed. Thereupon the city of Lynchburg filed its 
bill to enjoin and restrain the officers from selling the tim-
ber or from collecting the said taxes, claiming that the 
property was not liable for taxation. 
Upon hearing the case the Judge of the Circuit' Court 
entered a decree enjoining the officers from collection any 
of the taxes referred to in the bill upon the ground that 
the property wa.s not taxable under the Constitution and 
laws of the State. From this decree appeal was taken to 
the Court of Appeals. 
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In the petition for appeal it is said: 
"The Court will observe that the question here 
presented is simply whether or not the property 
constit:uting the water supply system of the city, 
from the use of which the city derives a revenue 
over and above the cost of its maintenance, is liable 
to taxation under the Constitution and statutes un-
der which the assessments have been made.'' 
''The same question has been raised by the City 
of Richmond in a similar proceeding to assess the 
water supply system of the City of Richmond, and 
that case is now pending in an appeal in this court.'' 
''The questions in that case are identical with 
the questions here presented, and it is respectfully 
submitted that it is a matte-r of great importance to 
the Commonwealth that the questions here raised 
shall be finally settled by an authoritative adjudica-
tion by this court of the proper interpretation of the 
Constitutional provisions, and the laws passed in 
pursuance thereof, with reference to this kind of 
property.'' 
When the decision in the case of Com. vs. Richmond, 
above referred to, was handed down, the Lynchburg case 
was dismissed from the docket of the Court of Appeals, 
upon the suggestion of Hon. John Garland Pollard·, who 
at that time was the Attorney General for the State, and 
upon the ground that the decision in the Richmond case 
controlled the Lynchburg case. 
We submit that not only is the use of the property in 
the instant case essentially a public use, under the authori-
ties above cited, but we submit further the fact that the 
Constitution provides for the purchase of revenue produc-
ing property and issuing bonds known as '' b'' bonds 
against it without declaring it to be subject to taxation must 
be conclusive that it was not intend-ed that such property 
should be subject to taxation. 
The fact that the City, under the duty imposed upon 
it by general law, as well by the Act of 1926, p; 880, fur-
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nishes water to ·coMllmleTS outside Gf the: City, heretQfore 
served by the Water Company, cannot be used as a basis 
o1f argument ag.ainst the right. of exempti0n. herein c-laimed. 
If it be true, as contended by us, that t'he City is 
e:ntitre·d. to own and operate a water system, and if it be true 
further that such water system is exempt from taxation 
under Secti0n 1S3 of the Constitution, surely it cannot be 
argned that the Legislature,. by imposing a condition upon 
sneh oWBers·hip, can the1reoy change the character of such 
ownership from public to private, and so d-efeat the right 
o£ exemption. guaranteed under the Constitution. To so 
argue would be to place the power of the Legislature above 
the Constitution and put it in the power of the Legislature 
to destroy a constitutional provision. The condition im-
posed by the Legislature is one that it had the right to 
impose, and from which the City could not escape. No 
Legislature would permit the passage of a bill that would 
not compel the City, under such conditions, to supply water 
to the original consumers from the plant, nor prevent the 
extension o:f the service in those communities ; no Legisla-
ture having the interest of the public, both in the cities and 
counties, would permit the paralysis of any community by 
any such treatment, nor will it thrust upon the City an ex-
tra bur'd~en in return for the public trust imposed upon and 
confided to it. 
Wood vs. Detroit 155 N. W .. 592. 
Smith vs. Mayor of Nashville 12 S. W. 925. 
Pikes. Peak Power Co. vs. Colorado Springs 105 Fed. 1. 
City of Omaha vs. Douglas Co. 148 N. W. 938. 
Omaha Water Co. vs .. Omaha 218 U.S. 180. 
San Francisco vs. McGovern 152 Pac. 980. 
Board of Frankfort vs. Com. 94 S. W. 648. 
Mayo vs. Dover 53 Atl. 62. 
Fellows vs. Los Angeles 90 Pac. 137. 
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ACT OF 1922. 
If our position be correct as to the right of exemption 
here claimed, such right applies with equal force to the 
taxes claimed by the county for that portion of 1926 sub-
quent to the date of purchase by the city and the dedication 
of the property to the public use for which it was acquired. 
1 In this case the purchase and the dedication were co-in-
cident. If the right of exemption applies, it applies im-
mediately upon the dedication and the lien for taxes, if 
any, at the time of the dedication, stands released. 
That this lien is released as of that date, counsel would 
refer the court to the following authorities. 
Laurel vs. Weems 56 So. 451. 
Flannagan vs. Land Development Co. ·( 1919) 145 La. 
842 So. 39. 
Note to Laurel vs. Weems 1914 Anno Cases 161. 
Gachet vs. City of New Orleans 27 Southern Reporter 
349. 
Note 30 A. L. R. p. 413. 
Smith vs. Santa Monica 121 Pac. 920. 
Gasaway vs. Seattle 100 Pac. 991. 
State vs. Snohomish County (1912) 71 Wash. 320, 128 
Pac. 667. 
Counsel for the county contend that this act is uncon-
,stitutional upon the ground that the legislature attempts 
thereby to exempt property from taxation, which right is 
denied it by the Constitution. 
We respectfully submit that this is not the purpose or 
the intendment of the act, under any fair construction. 
-..... The legislature does not attempt in this act to exempt any 
·, property from taxation. The purpose of the act, as stated 
\in its· title is for the relief of all tax payers whose property 
·\has been or shall be acquired by the State or any muni-
tipality thereof. The act itself provides that all tax payers 
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whose property is so taken shall be relieved from the pay-
ment of taxes and levies on such property for that portion 
of the year in which said property is taken from and after 
the date upon which the title is vested in the State of Vir-
ginia, or any county or municipality thereof. The remain-
der of' the act is devoted to the procedure by which this 
relief is had. 
Tliis is not an exemption statute and, as there is no 
Constitutional prohibition against j.t, the legislature had a 
right to enact same. 
Demoval vs. Davidson County 10 S. W. 353. 
CONCLUSION. 
In tlie acquirement and operation of the waterworks 
system, the City has acted in strict accordance with the 
law. To insure an adequate supply, as well as pure a sup-
ply as possible for itself and those whom it was under ob-
ligation to furnish, it purchased so much, and only so much, 
land as in its judgment was necessary for these purposes. 
In a matter so vital to the health and happiness of its peo-
ple, as well as its own growth and prosperity, the City 
would have been derelict in its duty, if it had not secured 
what, in the judgment of as good engineering advice as 
could be obtained, was essential. And its judgment has 
been confirmed by the deliberate act of the Legislature au-
thorizing the purchase. In furnishing water to others than 
its own inhabitants, it has acted under the express mandate 
of the Legislature. In this particular, the City was with-
out -discretion, for the ·supremacy of the Legislature over 
municipalities in Virginia cannot be denied. 
And we submit, in conclusion, that the ruling of the 
lower Court, in holding the property in. this case exempt 
from taxation, is in keeping with the legislative policy of 
the State, and in strict conformity with the decisions of 
our Supreme Court of Appeals upon which construction 
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the City had a right to rely. A policy followed today and 
for many years by many of the Cities of Virginia; a judi-
cial construction so uniform in character as to be conclusive 
of the right of exemption here claimed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
R. M. LETT, 
Attorney for the City of Newport News. 
S. R. BUXTON, 
Special Counsel for the City of Newport News. 
